Coordination and Bargaining over the Gaussian Interference Channel by Liu, Xi & Erkip, Elza
ar
X
iv
:1
00
5.
13
39
v1
  [
cs
.IT
]  
8 M
ay
 20
10
Coordination and Bargaining over the Gaussian
Interference Channel
Xi Liu and Elza Erkip
ECE Department, Polytechnic Institute of NYU, Brooklyn, NY 11201
Email: xliu02@students.poly.edu, elza@poly.edu
Abstract—This work considers coordination and bargaining
between two selfish users over a Gaussian interference channel
using game theory. The usual information theoretic approach
assumes full cooperation among users for codebook and rate
selection. In the scenario investigated here, each selfish user is
willing to coordinate its actions only when an incentive exists
and benefits of cooperation are fairly allocated. To improve
communication rates, the two users are allowed to negotiate for
the use of a simple Han-Kobayashi type scheme with fixed power
split and conditions for which users have incentives to cooperate
are identified. The Nash bargaining solution (NBS) is used as a
tool to get fair information rates. The operating point is obtained
as a result of an optimization problem and compared with a
TDM-based one in the literature.
I. INTRODUCTION
Interference channel (IC) is a fundamental model in in-
formation theory for studying interference in communication
systems. In this model, multiple senders transmit independent
messages to their corresponding receivers via a common chan-
nel. The capacity region or the sum-rate capacity for the two-
user Gaussian IC is only known in special cases such as the
strong interference case [1] [2] or the noisy interference case
[3]; the characterization of the capacity region for the general
case remains an open problem. Recently, it has been shown
in [4] that a simplified version of a scheme due to Han and
Kobayashi [2] results in an achievable rate region that is within
one bit of the capacity region of the complex Gaussian IC.
However, any type of Han-Kobayashi (H-K) scheme requires
full cooperation1 between the two users through the choice
of transmission strategy. In practice, users are selfish in the
sense that they choose a transmission strategy to maximize
their own rates. They may not have an incentive to comply
with a certain rule as in the H-K scheme and therefore not all
rate pairs in an achievable rate region are actually attainable.
When there is no coordination among the users, interference
is usually treated as noise, which is information theoretically
suboptimal in most cases.
In this paper, we study a scenario where two users operating
over a Gaussian IC are selfish but willing to coordinate and
This material is based upon work partially supported by NSF Grant No.
0635177, by the Center for Advanced Technology in Telecommunications
(CATT) of Polytechnic Institute of NYU.
1Throughout the paper, “cooperation” means cooperation for the choice
of transmission strategy including codebook and rate selection, which is
different from cooperation in information transmission as in cooperative
communications.
bargain to get good and fair information rates. When users
have conflicting interests, the problem of achieving efficiency
and fairness could be formulated as a game-theoretical prob-
lem. The Gaussian IC was studied using noncooperative game
theory in [5] [6], where it was assumed that the receivers treat
the interference as Gaussian noise. For the related Gaussian
multiple-access channel (MAC), it was shown in [7] that in a
noncooperative rate game with two selfish users choosing their
transmission rates independently, all points on the dominant
face of the capacity region are pure strategy Nash Equilibria
(NE). However, no single NE is superior to the others, making
it impossible to single out one particular NE to operate at.
The authors resorted to a mixed strategy which is inefficient
in performance. Noncooperative information theoretical games
were considered by Berry and Tse assuming that each user
can select any encoding and decoding strategy to maximize
its own rate and a Nash equilibrium region was characterized
for a class of deterministic IC’s [8]. Extensions were made
to a symmetric Gaussian IC in [9]. Another game theoretical
approach for interfering links is due to Han et al. [10], where
the NBS from cooperative game theory was used as a tool to
develop a fair resource allocation algorithm for uplink multi-
cell OFDMA systems. Reference [11] analyzed the NBS over
the flat and frequency selective fading IC for time or frequency
division multiplexing (TDM/FDM). The emphasis there was
on the weak interference case. However, as we will show
later, for the strong and mixed interference regimes, the NBS
based on TDM/FDM may not perform very well, due to the
suboptimality of TDM/FDM in those regimes.
In this work, assuming each user is selfish but willing to
coordinate its action when an incentive exists, we formulate
the interaction between the two users as a bargaining problem.
We first illustrate how selfish users can bargain for a fair rate
allocation over a Gaussian MAC. We then propose a two-phase
mechanism for coordination between users over the Gaussian
IC. First, the two users negotiate and only if certain incentive
conditions are satisfied they agree to use a simple H-K type
scheme with a fixed power split that gives the optimal or close
to optimal sets of achievable rates [4]. In the second phase,
the NBS is used as a fairness criterion to obtain a preferred
operating point over the achievable rate region. For all values
of channel parameters, we study the incentive conditions for
users to coordinate their transmissions. We also formulate the
computation of the NBS over the H-K rate region as a convex
optimization problem. Results show that the NBS exhibits
significant rate improvements for both users compared with the
uncoordinated case. The NBS obtained here can also achieve
the maximum sum rate of the adopted H-K scheme in most
cases, which demonstrates its strong efficiency.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
A. Channel Model
In this paper, we focus on the two-user standard Gaussian
IC
Y1 = X1 +
√
aX2 + Z1 (1)
Y2 =
√
bX1 +X2 + Z2 (2)
where Xi and Yi represent the input and output of user
i ∈ {1, 2}, respectively, and Z1 and Z2 are i.i.d. Gaussian
with zero mean and unit variance. Receiver i is only interested
in the message sent by transmitter i. Constants
√
a and
√
b
represent the real-valued channel gains of the interfering links.
If a ≥ 1 and b ≥ 1, the channel is strong Gaussian IC; if either
0 < a < 1 and b ≥ 1, or 0 < b < 1 and a ≥ 1, the channel is
mixed Gaussian IC; if 0 < a < 1 and 0 < b < 1, the channel
is weak Gaussian IC. We assume that transmitter of user i,
i ∈ {1, 2}, is subject to an average power constraint Pi. We
let SNRi = Pi be the signal to noise ratio (SNR) of user i.
B. Achievable Rate Region
The best known inner bound for the two-user Gaussian IC
is the full H-K achievable region [2]. Even when the input
distributions in the H-K scheme are restricted to be Gaussian,
computation of the full H-K region remains difficult due to
numerous degrees of freedom involved in the problem [12].
Therefore we assume users employ Gaussian codebooks with
equal length codewords and consider a simplified H-K type
scheme with fixed power split and no time-sharing as in [4].
Let α ∈ [0, 1] and β ∈ [0, 1] denote the fractions of power
allocated to the private messages (messages only to be decoded
at intended receivers) of user 1 and user 2 respectively. We
define F as the collection of all rate pairs (R1, R2) ∈ R2+
satisfying
R1 ≤ φ1 = C
(
P1
1 + aβP2
)
(3)
R2 ≤ φ2 = C
(
P2
1 + bαP1
)
(4)
R1 +R2 ≤ φ3 = min{φ31, φ32, φ33} (5)
with
φ31 = C
(
P1 + a(1− β)P2
1 + aβP2
)
+ C
(
βP2
1 + bαP1
)
(6)
φ32 = C
(
αP1
1 + aβP2
)
+ C
(
P2 + b(1− α)P1
1 + bαP1
)
(7)
φ33 = C
(
αP1 + a(1− β)P2
1 + aβP2
)
+ C
(
βP2 + b(1− α)P1
1 + bαP1
)
(8)
and
2R1 +R2 ≤ φ4 = C
(
P1 + a(1− β)P2
1 + aβP2
)
+ C
(
αP1
1 + aβP2
)
+C
(
βP2 + b(1− α)P1
1 + bαP1
)
(9)
R1 + 2R2 ≤ φ5 = C
(
P2 + b(1− α)P1
1 + bαP1
)
+ C
(
βP2
1 + bαP1
)
+C
(
αP1 + a(1− β)P2
1 + aβP2
)
(10)
where C(x) = 1/2 log2(1 + x). The region F is a polytope
and a function of α and β. We denote the H-K scheme that
achieves the rate region F by HK(α, β). For convenience, we
also represent F in a matrix form as F = {R|R ≥ 0, R ≤
R
1, andAR ≤ B}, where R = (R1 R2)t, R1 = (φ1 φ2)t,
B = (φ3 φ4 φ5)
t
, and
A =
(
1 2 1
1 1 2
)t
(11)
Throughout the paper, for any two vectorsU andV, we denote
U ≥ V if and only if Ui ≥ Vi for all i. U ≤ V, U > V and
U < V are defined similarly.
C. Nash Bargaining Solution
We employ the NBS as a criterion for selecting the desired
operating point from a given achievable rate region, due to its
Pareto optimality and fairness. In the following, we briefly
review the basic concepts and results for the NBS in the
context of our problem. More details are provided in Section
III and Section IV.
We denote by R0i the rate user i would expect when both
treat each other’s signals as Gaussian noise. So we have
R01 = C(
P1
1+aP2
) and R02 = C( P21+bP1 ). We choose R
0 =
(R01 R
0
2)
t as the disagreement point, i.e., when negotiation
breaks down, both users can transmit without cooperation at
rates in R0. The bargaining problem can be represented by
the pair (F ,R0). We say (F ,R0) is essential iff there exists
at least one allocation R′ in F that is strictly better for both
users than R0, i.e., the set F ∩{R|R > R0} is nonempty. In
order for both users to have incentives for cooperation, it is
required that (F ,R0) be essential; otherwise, at least one user
does not have the incentive to bargain. A payoff allocation R
is said to be Pareto optimal iff there is no other allocation R′
such that R′i ≥ Ri, ∀i, and ∃i, R′i > Ri.
This bargaining problem is approached axiomatically by
Nash [13]. R∗ = Φ(F ,R0) is said to be an NBS in F for
R
0
, if the following axioms are satisfied.
1) Individual Rationality: Φi(F ,R0) ≥ R0i , ∀i
2) Feasibility: Φ(F ,R0) ∈ F
3) Pareto Optimality: Φ(F ,R0) is Pareto optimal.
4) Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives: For any closed
convex set G, if G ⊆ F and Φ(F ,R0) ∈ G, then
Φ(G,R0) = Φ(F ,R0).
5) Scale Invariance: For any numbers λ1, λ2, γ1 and γ2,
such that λ1 > 0 and λ2 > 0, if G = {(λ1R1 +
γ1, λ2R2 + γ2)|(R1, R2) ∈ F} and ω = (λ1R01 +
γ1, λ2R
0
2 + γ2), then Φ(G, ω) = (λ1Φ1(F ,R0) +
γ1, λ2Φ2(F ,R0) + γ2).
6) Symmetry: If R01 = R02, and {(R2, R1)|(R1, R2) ∈
F} = F , then Φ1(F ,R0) = Φ2(F ,R0).
Axioms (4)-(6) are also called axioms of fairness.
Theorem 1: [13] There is a unique solution Φ(F ,R0) that
satisfies all six axioms in the above, and is given by,
Φ(F ,R0) = arg max
R∈F ,R≥R0
2∏
i=1
(Ri −R0i ) (12)
The NBS selects the unique allocation that maximizes the
Nash product in (12) over all feasible individual rational
allocations. Note that for any essential bargaining problem,
the Nash point should always satisfy R∗i > R0i , ∀i.
III. BARGAINING OVER THE TWO-USER GAUSSIAN MAC
Before we move to the Gaussian IC, we first consider
a Gaussian MAC in which two users send information to
one common receiver. This also forms the foundation for the
solution of the strong IC. The received signal is given by
Y = X1 +X2 + Z (13)
where Xi is the input signal of user i and Z is Gaussian noise
with zero mean and unit variance. Each user has an individual
average input power constraint Pi. The capacity region C is
the set of all rate pairs (R1, R2) such that
Ri ≤ C(Pi), i ∈ {1, 2} (14)
R1 +R2 ≤ φ0 = C(P1 + P2) (15)
If the two users fully cooperate in codebook and rate selection,
any point in C is achievable. When there is no coordination
between users, in the worst case, one user’s signal can be
treated as noise in the decoding of the other user’s signal,
leading to rate R0i = C( Pi1+P3−i ) for user i. In [7], R0i is
also called user i’s “safe rate”. If the two users are selfish but
willing to coordinate for mutual benefits, they may bargain
over C to obtain a fair operating point with R0 serving as a
disagreement point.
Proposition 1: There exists a unique NBS for the bargain-
ing problem (C,R0), given by R∗ = (R01 + 1µ1 , R02 + 1µ1 )
where µ1 = 2φ0−R01−R02 .
Proof: Maximizing the Nash product in (12) with F
replaced by C is equivalent to maximizing its logarithm.
Define f(R) = ln(R1 − R01) + ln(R2 − R02), then f(·) :
C ∩ {R|R ≥ R0} → R+ is a strictly concave function of
R. Also note that the constraints in (12), (14) and (15) are
linear in R1 and R2. So the first order Karush-Kuhn-Tucker
conditions are necessary and sufficient for optimality [14]. Let
L(R, λ, µ) denote the Lagrangian where λi ≥ 0, i = 1, 2 and
µ1 ≥ 0 denote the Lagrange multipliers associated with the
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Fig. 1. The Nash point over the MAC when SNR1 = 15dB, SNR2 = 20dB
constraints, then we have
L(R, λ, µ) = f(R) +
2∑
i=1
λi(Ri −R0i ) + µ1(φ0 −R1 −R2)
(16)
The first-order necessary and sufficient conditions yield
1 + (λi − µ1) (R∗i −R0i ) = 0; i = 1, 2 (17)
and
(R∗i − R0i )λi = 0; λi ≥ 0; i = 1, 2 (18)
(R∗1 +R
∗
2 − φ0)µ1 = 0; µ1 ≥ 0 (19)
Since R∗i > R0i must hold, we have λi = 0 for i = 1, 2. Also
the constraint φ0 −R∗1 −R∗2 ≥ 0 has to be active, i.e.,
R∗1 +R
∗
2 = φ0 (20)
Solving (17) and (20), we obtain µ1 = 2φ0−R01−R02 and R
∗
i =
R0i +
1
µ1
, i = 1, 2 .
In Fig. 1, the capacity region, the disagreement point and the
NBS obtained using Proposition 1 are illustrated for SNR1 =
15dB and SNR2 = 20dB. Recall that the mixed strategy NE in
[7] has an average performance equal to the safe rates in R0.
The NBS point which is the unique fair Pareto-optimal point
in C is component-wise superior. This shows that bargaining
can improve the rates for both of the selfish users in a MAC.
IV. TWO-USER GAUSSIAN IC
For the IC, the coordination between the two users is done
in two phases. In phase 1, they negotiate for a simple H-K
type scheme that has the potential to improve individual rates
for both. The private message power factors α, β in the H-
K scheme are jointly determined by both users and depend
on their power constraints P1, P2 and channel parameters
a and b. If at least one user does not have the incentive to
cooperate in the sense of Sec II-C, then negotiation breaks
down; otherwise, they reach an agreement on the use of the
H-K type scheme with the chosen power split. In phase 2, both
users bargain for a fair rate pair in the bargaining set which
is the achievable rate region of the H-K scheme they agreed
on earlier. This problem can then be formulated as a two-user
bargaining problem with the feasibility set F and disagreement
point R0. Once a particular rate pair is determined as the
solution, related codebook information is shared between the
users so that one user’s receiver can decode the other user’s
common message as required by the adopted H-K scheme in
agreement. If negotiation breaks down, each receiver is not
provided with the interfering user’s codebook.
A. Conditions for users to have incentives to cooperate
In this subsection, we discuss the incentive conditions for
both users to cooperate and how they jointly choose α and
β for different interference regimes. In the first phase, the
two users search for a H-K scheme that could result in a
rate region containing rate pairs component-wise better than
R
0
. Intuitively, it would be best to have a scheme that could
achieve the largest rate region that includes R0. While the
full H-K achievable region [2] needs to take into account all
possible power splits and different time-sharing strategies, it is
computationally infeasible. For tractability, we restrict the two
users’ choices to a simple H-K type scheme with fixed power
split and no time-sharing. For the weak and mixed interference
cases, we study incentive conditions for cooperation based on
the near-optimal power split of [4]. For the strong interference
case, we set α = β = 0, which is known to be optimal [1].
1) Strong Interference: Suppose a ≥ 1 and b ≥ 1, and we
choose optimal α = β = 0. Treating interference as noise
is suboptimal and R0 always lies inside F . The bargaining
problem (F ,R0) is essential and hence both users always have
incentives to cooperate.
2) Mixed Interference: Without loss of generality, we as-
sume a < 1 and b ≥ 1. We use the near-optimal power
splits α = 0 and β = min(1/(aP2), 1) [4]. If aP2 ≤ 1, the
interference from user 2 has a smaller effect on user 1 than
the noise at user 1’s receiver does. The scheme HK(0, 1) will
not improve user 1’s rate and hence user 1 does not have an
incentive to cooperate using this scheme. But if aP2 > 1 and
F ∩ {R > R0} is nonempty when α = 0 and β = 1/(aP2),
it is possible to improve both users’ rates relative to those in
R
0
.
Note that aP2 > 1 holds when a > 1/P2. When SNR2 is
high, this condition is satisfied for most a’s. This implies that
in the interference limited regimes, it is very likely that both
users would have incentives to cooperate. The case for a ≥ 1
and b < 1 can be analyzed similarly.
3) Weak Interference: Suppose a < 1 and b < 1.
We use the power splits α = min(1/(bP1), 1) and β =
min(1/(aP2), 1) [4]. Similar to the mixed case, only if
aP2 > 1, bP1 > 1 and F ∩ {R > R0} is nonempty when
α = 1/(bP1) and β = 1/(aP2), both users’ rates can be
improved compared with those in R0.
Note that as in the mixed case, when both SNR’s are
high, the conditions aP2 > 1 and bP1 > 1 are satisfied for
most channel gains in the range and it only remains to check
whether F ∩ {R > R0} is nonempty.
B. Computing the Nash Bargaining Solution
After the users agree on an H-K scheme, in phase 2, the
NBS over the corresponding rate region F is employed as
the operating point. We concentrate on the case when R0 <
R
1 andAR0 < B so that F ∩ {R > R0} is nonempty. From
Section II, we know that, the NBS exists for (F ,R0) and is
unique. It can be computed by optimizing (12).
Proposition 2: Assuming that R0 < R1 and AR0 < B,
there exists a unique NBS R∗ for the bargaining problem
(F ,R0), which is characterized as follows:
R∗i = min
{
R1i ;R
0
i +
1∑3
j=1 µjAji
}
, i ∈ {1, 2} (21)
where µj ≥ 0, j ∈ {1, 2, 3} is chosen to satisfy
(AR∗ −B)jµj = 0, AR∗ ≤ B
Proof: As in the proof of Proposition 1, we use the La-
grange multiplier method and Karush-Kuhn-Tucker optimality
conditions. Due to limited space, the proof is omitted.
V. ILLUSTRATION OF RESULTS
The achievable rate region of the H-K scheme and the H-K
NBS are plotted for different values of channel coefficients
in Fig. 2. For comparison, we also include the TDM region
and the TDM NBS. The TDM region is given by RTDM =
{R|R = (ρ1C(P1ρ1 ) ρ2C(P2ρ2 ))t, ρi ≥ 0, ∀i, ρ1 + ρ2 ≤ 1}
and the TDM NBS is computed by optimizing (12) with
F replaced by RTDM. The NBS based on TDM was also
investigated in [11] using the unique competitive solution
studied there as the disagreement point. Since interference
limited regimes are more of interest here, in these plots, we
assume both SNR’s are high, i.e, SNR1 = SNR2 = 20dB.
In Fig. 2(a), both interfering links are strong, hence HK(0, 0)
is employed. The H-K NBS strictly dominates the TDM one.
Fig. 2(b) shows an example for mixed interference case when
a = 0.1 and b = 3. Since aP2 = 10 > 1, HK(0, 0.1) is
employed. In this example, although TDM results in some
rate pairs that are outside the H-K rate region, the H-K NBS
remains component-wise better2 than the TDM one. The weak
interference case when a = 0.2 and b = 0.5 is plotted in Fig.
2(c). Given these parameters, we have aP2 = 20 > 1 and
bP1 = 50 > 1, therefore HK(0.02, 0.05) is used. The H-K
NBS, though still much better than R0, is slightly worse than
the TDM one. This is because the TDM rate region contains
the H-K rate region due to the suboptimality of the simple
H-K scheme in the weak regime. Note that we do not employ
time sharing in the chosen H-K scheme. Finally, recall that
while the TDM rate region does not depend on a and b, since
R
0 does, the TDM NBS depends on a and b as well.
We compute the H-K NBS for different ranges of the
channel gains in Fig. 3. We assume SNR1 = SNR2 = 20dB,
a = 1.5 and b varies from 0 to 3. For all b’s, both users’ rates
in the NBS R∗ are higher than those in R0. The improvement
of each user’s rate in R∗ over the one in R0 increases as b
grows. When b < a, user 1’s rate in the NBS is less than user
2Note this may not necessarily hold for all SNR’s and the channel gains in
the range. In other words, for some other parameters, it is possible that one
user gets a higher rate in the TDM NBS than in the H-K NBS.
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Fig. 2. The H-K NBS of the Gaussian IC in different interference regimes when SNR1 = SNR2 = 20dB.
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Fig. 3. Rates in the NBS R∗ and disagreement point R0 when SNR1 =
SNR2 = 20dB and a = 1.5.
2’s; however, as b grows beyond a, user 1’s rate in the NBS
surpasses user 2’s, which is due to the fairness property of
the NBS. Alternatively we say a strong interfering link can
give user 1 an advantage in bargaining. In Fig. 4, we plot
the sum rates for H-K NBS and TDM NBS under the same
setting as in Fig. 3. For comparison, the maximum sum rate
of the H-K scheme with the chosen power split is also given.
The H-K NBS performs better in terms of sum rates than the
TDM NBS for all b’s except when b is around 1, where the
performances of the two schemes are similar. Moreover, the
H-K NBS rate pair can achieve the maximum sum rate of the
H-K scheme used for almost all b’s except when b is very small
(≤ 0.05), the sum rate of the H-K NBS is relatively lower.
This demonstrates that the H-K NBS not only provides a fair
operating point but also maintains a good overall performance.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we investigated the two-user Gaussian IC,
under the assumption that the two users are selfish and
interested in cooperation only when they have incentives to
do so. We proposed a two-phase mechanism for the two users
to coordinate, which consists of choosing a simple H-K type
scheme with Gaussian codebooks and fixed power split in
phase 1 and bargaining over the achievable rate region to
obtain a fair operating point in phase 2. We show that the
proposed mechanism can gain substantial rate improvements
for both users compared with the uncoordinated case. The
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Fig. 4. Sum rates in the H-K NBS when SNR1 = SNR2 = 20dB and
a = 1.5.
obtained operating point is also strongly efficient in the sense
that it can achieve the maximum sum rate of the adopted
simple H-K type scheme in most cases.
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